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Essays/Commentary 
A Call for Building Credible Brackish-Water  
Open Macroeconomic Models*
KRISHNA T. KUMAR 
 
George Washington University 
ABSTRACT 
The recent experience of macroeconomists in their inability to foresee and 
avert the prolonged global recession called into question the credibility of 
their economic theories and models. This paper is an attempt at 
introspection. The paper reviews the developments in macroeconomic 
theory and models and offers suggestions on what could have gone wrong 
with the prevailing macroeconomic theories and models. It suggests that 
there are dangers in following the mainstream models if such models are 
not based on empirical credibility in respect of fitting the real-life data 
they are supposed to explain. It suggests the limitations of statistical 
methods used in macroeconomic modeling and in the criteria used to 
establish their credibility and offers some suggestions to overcome those 
limitations. It brings to the fore the fact that what are now termed 
institutions “too big to fail” have not been modeled adequately by 
economists. The paper also suggests the importance of treating economies 
as open economy models with external sector and as truly dynamic with 
investment and growth.  
KEY WORDS  Global Recession; Macroeconomic Policy; Empirical Credibility of 
Models; Saltwater Economics; Sweetwater Economics  
About two years ago, a friend of mine asked me if I had any solution for the 
economic problem of prolonged recession in the United States. I explained to him that 
one of the reasons for the current business cycle in the United States is that the 
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Democratic and Republican parties choose policies that are broadly demand-side 
(saltwater) economics and supply-side (sweetwater) economics respectively, irrespective 
of whether the economy is in equilibrium or in a situation of excess supply or excess 
demand. If you add to this situation an independent monetary authority that is led for a 
prolonged period by a strong believer in supply-side economics, then the situation could 
become much worse, as demonstrated by the current prolonged recession in the United 
States. As a solution, I advocated a brackish-water open macroeconomic approach. I 
defined “brackish-water open macroeconomic approach” as one that (1) recognizes that 
economics depends on both supply and demand; (2) realizes that the economy could be in 
a state of disequilibrium or an undesired equilibrium (with either an excess demand or an 
excess supply); (3) recognizes the need for state intervention through economic policy 
aimed mainly at moving the economy from disequilibrium or undesired equilibrium 
toward the desired equilibrium growth path without creating its own disequilibrium; (4) 
recognizes the openness of the economy and its dependence on the external sector; and 
(5) makes the market and nonmarket (mainly state) forces work together with a common 
goal to move the economy toward the desired growth equilibrium.  
Kocherlakota (2010) said quite frankly:  
During the last financial crisis, macroeconomists (and I 
include myself among them) failed the country, and indeed 
the world. In September 2008, central bankers were in 
desperate need of a playbook that offered a systematic plan 
of attack to deal with fast-evolving circumstances. 
Macroeconomics should have been able to provide that 
playbook. It could not. Of course, from a longer view, 
macroeconomists let policymakers down much earlier, 
because they did not provide policymakers with rules to 
avoid the circumstances that led to the global financial 
meltdown. 
The entire economics profession is currently in disarray, and economists are 
wondering if their theories and models are good at all. Introspection is the call of the day. 
We must be able to clearly describe our scientific approach to design macroeconomic 
policies; otherwise, our undefined or ill-defined approaches will define ours as an 
unscientific profession. This paper is a small attempt toward outlining such a scientific 
approach by taking a bird’s-eye view of developments in macroeconomics and outlining 
some methods to establish greater credibility for macroeconomic theory and models.  
Before I present my views, I will briefly trace developments in macroeconomic 
theory and practice and the validation of macroeconomic theory with econometric tools, 
while acknowledging the limitations of such tools. This being a preliminary attempt at 
giving such an outline, there is no attempt made here to illustrate the suggested method 
with an empirical verification. 
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In the next section, I present a brief review of evolution of the mainstream 
macroeconomic theory and policy. This review draws heavily from Kocherlakota (2010) 
and Woodford (1999). I offer my own interpretation of underlying forces that operate in 
bringing about that revolution. In the third section, I give a sketch of some peripheral 
macroeconomic developments. The fourth section raises a few methodological and 
institutional problems associated with quantitative macroeconomic policy decisions, and 
in the fifth section, I highlight the need for unbiased and credible macroeconomic policies 
based on empirically tested and validated models. 
THE EVOLUTION OF MAINSTREAM MACROECONOMIC THEORY  
AND POLICY 
In the 1960s and ’70s, debates between the Keynesians and the Monetarists 
occupied our thoughts and discussions in classrooms, journal articles, and academic 
conferences. A very brief review of that scene is useful for the young economists in 
whose hands the future economic policy making lies. “Macroeconomics” as a term did 
not exist until after World War II and into the early 1950s. Instead, economists studied 
the subject matter either as a part of what was then called the quantity theory of money or 
as the theory of business cycles. Around the time of World War II and after the Great 
Depression, macroeconomic theory emerged as put forth by Keynes (1936). Keynes 
argued that monetary policy breaks down if there is a liquidity trap that gives rise to 
equilibrium below the full-employment level and that the situation could be improved 
through a fiscal policy by stimulating the economy with government spending. This 
prescription was a significant departure from the existing classical theory, particularly 
because of the concept of “sticky wages” that Keynes postulated. The new theory broke 
the dichotomy between the real sector and the monetary sector assumed by the classical 
theory. One might argue that the sticky-wages argument or the distinction between 
money wages and real wages is an arbitrary artifact introduced by Keynes to justify his 
policies of state intervention; however, it is more reasonable to argue that Keynes brought 
more realism into economic modeling by introducing wage contracts and the inflexibility 
of money wages in the short run due to such contracts. Keynes incorporated some new 
concepts and constructs into mainstream economic theories that would validate what he 
observed in the real world. One might even wonder if he owed much of his ideas to Adolf 
Hitler’s successful economic policies, as within four years of taking over as the 
chancellor of Germany in 1933, Hitler drastically reduced unemployment through public 
works (Weber 2011).  
As economics is not an experimental science, and as macroeconomic data were 
not well developed, macroeconomists tended to develop their theories, methods, and 
models governed more by a herd behavior than by a scientific method. (For more on herd 
behavior in economics, see Banerjee (1992) and Kumar (2003).) Over the years, 
economists interpreted Keynesian theory as giving the state a much higher role than in 
the classical theory and as assigning fiscal policy a higher status than monetary policy. 
The debate between the old and new theories thus turned out to be a debate between the 
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dominance of fiscal versus monetary policy. The prescription to create additional demand 
to move the equilibrium from a lower level of employment and output to higher levels of 
the same has come to be known as demand-side economics, eventually metamorphosing 
into what is now known as saltwater economics.  
Such herd behavior had to be tempered with scientific concerns so the profession 
could maintain its standing within the professional academic community. Macroeconomic 
theories needed to be integrated and made consistent with the highly acclaimed and 
accepted neoclassical microeconomic theory, but also with empirical evidence in order to 
lead to further developments of Keynesian macroeconomic theory. Klein (1947) provided 
credibility to Keynesian theory by showing micro-foundations of Keynesian 
macroeconomics. Several economists, including Klein, provided empirical evidence to the 
various structural equations of the Keynesian model (Patinkin 1975).    
Friedman opposed the Keynesian theories and adhered instead to the quantity 
theory of money, maintaining first the neutrality of money and later the position that 
monetary policy is better than fiscal policy. He also advocates Say’s law that supply 
creates its own demand (in the long run). He maintained that one can create investment 
and growth (in the long run) through credit and an increase in money supply. Keynes 
retorted that in the long run, we are all dead—implying that the long run was too long and 
that we cannot depend on the markets alone—and advocated his demand-side policies.  
As the Keynesian theory was already well grounded and widely accepted with 
micro-foundations and empirical verification, Friedman used the main features of 
Keynesian theory intact but modified them in form and empirical substance. He was very 
good in his knowledge of scientific methodology and statistical theory of 
misspecification analysis. What better way is there of exploiting Keynes than to use 
Keynes’s own criticism of Tinbergen’s econometric method? Keynes remarked, “For 
example, suppose three factors are taken into account, it is not enough that these should 
be in fact verae cause; there must be no other significant factor. If there is a further 
factor, not taken account of, then the method is not able to discover the relative 
quantitative importance of the first three. This means that the method is only applicable 
where the economist is able to provide beforehand a correct and indubitably complete 
analysis of the significant factors” (Keynes 1939:560). 
Thus, Friedman knew that he could modify some of the equations in the 
Keynesian system by adding new variables (correlated with already existing ones) so as 
to alter the impact of the existing variables in ways that supported his ideological 
viewpoint. To wit, he introduced permanent income as an additional variable to reduce 
the impact of the Keynesian multiplier effect, as will be demonstrated in the next 
paragraph.   
Suppose, as postulated by Friedman, that the true consumption function must use 
permanent income in addition to current income. This is equivalent to saying that the 
Keynesian consumption function is misspecified by omitting a relevant variable (the 
permanent income) that is positively correlated with the included variable (the current 
income). This misspecification introduces a positive bias in the estimate of marginal 
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propensity to consume, the bias being the regression coefficient of the omitted variable 
(positive) multiplied by the (positive) correlation between the omitted variable 
(permanent income) and the included variable (current income). In this way, Friedman 
argued that the Keynesian marginal propensity to consume is an overestimate of the true 
marginal propensity to consume. In other words, Friedman argued that the Keynesian 
multiplier is an overestimate. (For misspecification analysis in regression, see Gujarati 
2003:511).) 
Friedman also modified the Phillips curve that related inflation to unemployment. 
His specification of the Phillips curve also involved adding a new variable. Anyone today 
with a minimal amount of knowledge in econometrics, can see that the modified 
equations with additional explanatory variables will have better explanatory power 
(Gujarati 2003:217) and that omitting correlated variables could generate biases in 
coefficients of other variables in the model (as demonstrated above). By his choice of 
additional variables, Friedman could articulate his point of view quite successfully, 
making the best use of Keynes’s own methodological criticism against Tinbergen’s 
econometric method. Using this technique, Friedman achieved his goal of toppling the 
Keynesian theory from the top position. Friedman’s theory came to be known as supply-
side, or sweetwater, economics. The Social Science Research Council (SSRC) 
econometric model and the MIT–Federal Reserve Board (FRB) model were pressed into 
service to provide the needed empirical support in favor of or against these models. As 
one model cannot be used to verify another model, a combined model was formulated 
that accommodated both theories to be tested (Cooper and Fisher 1974), but then the 
model became so large and the macroeconomic data so inadequate that econometric 
evidence supported both models!  
Friedman’s ideas were further boosted by Lucas’s rational expectations 
hypothesis. Although the closed-economy Keynesian models could not explain the 
worldwide stagflation experienced in the 1970s, this hybrid monetarist model could; thus, 
the so-called new classical theory, which assumed market-clearing, rational optimization 
behavior with rational expectations, became the mainstream macroeconomic theory. As 
can be seen, this was through herd behavior among the economists and not by any 
empirical verification and vindication. (For a distinction between various prevailing 
macroeconomic theories, see Greenwald and Stiglitz (1987).)  
These different versions of the macroeconomic models are closed macro models 
of a single economy that ignored the openness of the economy. It is clear that when the 
United States experienced stagflation in the 1970s, the US economy was quite open, with 
imports of manufactured goods from Japan, China, and Korea, and oil from the Middle 
East. It is surprising that within the mainstream of macroeconomic theory, no one thought 
until 1985 of explaining the worldwide stagflation using the Keynesian macroeconomic 
model with exogenous shocks coming from an open economy. Michael Bruno and 
Jeffrey Sachs (who were conducting research on that topic at the National Bureau of 
Economic Research (NBER) and the World Bank in 1985) could explain global 
stagflation employing a Keynesian model but with exogenous oil shocks of the 1970s. 
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Their work seems to have been mostly ignored by mainstream macroeconomists in the 
United States. It is surprising that despite the balance of payment deficits accruing during 
the postwar period and the warnings that Triffin (1960) gave on a weakening dollar, the 
mainstream macroeconomists did not consider explaining stagflation employing an open 
economy macro model. 
The new classical macroeconomic synthesis is a full integration of short-run 
disequilibrium dynamics in which an aggregate demand adjusts to a predetermined 
potential output under the assumption that the economic agents optimize their behavior 
with expectations of the future (a dynamic general equilibrium model). When stochastic 
shocks to the system are introduced, it becomes a stochastic dynamic general equilibrium 
model. The real business cycle model goes a step further and tries to explain what could 
cause the shocks to the system (i.e., supply-and-demand shocks). Such stochastic 
dynamic general equilibrium models have been able to explain the output, consumption, 
and investment growth in a number of closed economies (Prescott 1986). Such stochastic 
dynamic general equilibrium models are also used to study the effect of fiscal policies on 
output, employment, and saving (Auerbach and Kotlikoff 1987). As the new classical 
model of the Friedman school already incorporated major elements of the Keynesian 
model, the real business cycles (RBC) model is the present-day mainstream 
macroeconomic paradigm for closed economies. This mainstream macroeconomic model 
erroneously assumes that all people form expectations that are consistent with the model, 
and hence those expectations will be realized—under the very unrealistic assumption that 
this is the only true model. Those who subscribe to this model are in a make-believe 
economic world! 
Let us further discuss other things that are wrong with this model. First, 
economists themselves do not agree on a common model, and hence their expectations 
cannot be rational. To prove this statement, one need only look to the recent global 
financial crisis that was not predicted by economists and their models. Second, it is quite 
obvious that different people have different information on how the economy (or a part of 
it) works and therefore do not all have the same expectations. Consequently, expectations 
in real life are not rational expectations as defined by economists. Third, people behave 
and make economic decisions on the basis of how they think other people will behave. 
When people have differing information, they behave differently and expect others to 
behave differently. This model does not take into account the decisions leading to long-
term investments leading to growth.  
If a macroeconomic model has to represent a real economy, it may have to be an 
open economy model with investment and growth. It must consider how the politics and 
economics interact with each other. It must also allow for the possibility of different 
people to form different expectations, only some of which will be realized. It may also 
need to consider how certain large institutions, such as banks and non-banking financial 
institutions, function. I will discuss some of these extensions in the next section. 
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THE EVOLUTION OF PERIPHERAL MACROECONOMIC  
THEORIES AND POLICIES 
There are three kinds of peripheral macroeconomic theories and policy research, 
each with its own supporters. First, there are some groups of economists that pursue 
macroeconomics from entirely different perspectives than the mainstream. Their 
perspectives and approaches could still be relevant and meaningful under some 
circumstances. For this reason, there also exist side by side with such groups some others 
that follow heterodox methods, combining ideas from different groups. Prominent 
examples are different shades of post-Keynesian macroeconomists and monetarist 
economists who still stick to extreme ideologies, even when the mainstream has switched 
to a new classical synthesis.  
Second, a few economists follow some analogies from other fields of science such 
as physics and statistics. These economists do not have many followers.  
The third group consists of those who feel that the mainstream models do not 
adequately care for a certain institutional detail of some major part of the economy, and 
so they try to develop the model to take that part into consideration. These 
unconventional approaches do not have majority following and so have not yet become a 
part of the mainstream, not necessarily because their approach is rejected by scientific 
criteria but because of lack of popularity.  
Post-Keynesian Macroeconomics 
There are those who believe that some classical ideas such as capital 
accumulation, personal wealth, and income distribution must be a part of macroeconomic 
theory. Those who belong to the Post-Keynesian Cambridge School pursue this track. 
There are several papers along this line in the Cambridge Journal of Economics, Review 
of Political Economy, and the Journal of Post-Keynesian Economics. One may also see a 
recent review by Harcourt (2006).  
Statistical Approaches to Macroeconomics 
The neoclassical economics school is built around the classical mechanics 
paradigm of physics. Georgescu-Roegen (1971) took an alternative route and built an 
alternative economic theory based on the second law of thermodynamics. Masanoi 
Aoki’s school uses analogies from statistical physics and introduces very useful concepts 
of strategic interactions between different types of economic agents (Aoki 2002; Aoki 
and Yoshikawa 2006). Kumar (2002) uses a temporary equilibrium as the micro-
foundation, replaces rational expectations with the assumption that there are different 
types of individuals with different types of privileged information that generate stochastic 
individual responses. George Soros also points to this fact of different people having 
different expectations based on different information and knowledge on the working of 
the economic system. The reader may refer to the Institute for New Economic Thinking, 
8  Journal of the Indiana Academy of the Social Sciences Vol. 16, No. 2: Fall-Winter 2013 
established by George Soros. (See in particular the following link: http://ineteconomics 
.org/sites/inet.civicactions.net/files/INET%20C@K%20Paper%20Session%201%20-
%20Soros_0.pdf.) Kumar then uses Edgeworth-type aggregation of stochastic individual 
responses to arrive at a joint lognormal distribution of macroeconomic variables using 
Edgeworth’s central limit theorem. The net result is a vector autoregressive (VAR) 
macroeconomic model of Sims. Thus, he explains the observed statistical pattern of 
macroeconomic variables through a combination of economic and statistical principles in 
a truly Edgeworthian perspective and justifies a VAR model of Sims.  
Adding Details that Matter 
The recent prolonged recession and the failure of the financial system forced the 
US government to back certain financial institutions and a major auto manufacturer. 
Government officials justified this action under the principle that the companies in 
question were too big to fail. If the companies are too big to fail, the macroeconomic 
models must incorporate within them the institutional details on how the financial sector 
functions, how the large manufacturing sector functions, and how these institutions 
interact and control the political decision-making process, including the regulatory wing 
of the federal government. Although some of these details are dealt with in a peripheral 
way in macroeconomics literature, they are not integrated well enough to make the 
macroeconomic models credible for economic policy. These are discussed below. 
Integrating Detailed Financial Sector into a Macroeconomic Model 
As a result of the recent financial crisis, we are now coming to realize that 
economists’ inability to forecast the extent of the crisis and to take corrective steps is due 
to inadequate modeling of the institutional details of the financial intermediation sector 
(Kocherlakota 2010; Woodford 2010). The existing models until recently have envisaged 
the banking sector as one that performed only financial intermediation by taking deposits 
and advancing loans. Banks’ role as large corporations with non-banking functions in 
high-risk areas, their raising of capital through borrowed funds from mortgage-backed 
securities as well as deposits, their dependence on the housing market and the insurance 
market, and their exposure to government regulation and politics have historically not 
been taken into account. Adrian and Shin (2010a, 2010b) and Woodford (2010) address 
these issues.  
Political Business Cycles 
There are other economists who strongly believe that macroeconomic policy 
cannot ignore interaction between economics and politics, and as such, they would like to 
introduce politics into the macroeconomic model. Extensive literature on political 
business cycles takes this approach. It started with a pioneering paper by Nordhouse 
(1975). The works of Hibbs (1977, 1994), Alsena (1988), and Rogoff (1990) are quite 
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significant on this subject. They employ a macroeconomic model with employment and 
inflation as the target variables and with monetary and fiscal policies as instruments. The 
bipartisan models of Hibbs, Alsena, and Rogoff assume that a politician makes 
opportunistic policy decisions to maximize the chance of winning elections under the 
assumption that voters form expectations about the future performance of the politician 
on the basis of such policies. These models assume that voters form such expectations 
regarding the decisions to be made by both party candidates and choose the party whose 
policies they prefer. Drazen (2001) generalizes the earlier models by adding a monetary 
sector and by incorporating an independent monetary authority. These models are 
empirically tested, and the experience with these models is summarized in the papers by 
Alsena (prior to 1988) and Drazen (prior to 2000). These models explain pre and post-
election business cycles. 
Open Economy Macroeconomic Models for Single Country 
With increasing capital flows and trade flows between countries, there has been 
an increasing interest in open economy macro models. The standard investment saving-
liquidity preference money supply (IS-LM) model has been modified with aggregate 
demand, including net exports. This is popularly known as Mundell-Fleming-Dornbush 
model. The closed static IS-LM model has been made open using the Mundell-Fleming 
approach. This approach links the national income to domestic absorption (consumption 
expenditure plus government expenditure plus investment expenditure) to the current 
account deficit (exports minus imports) and extends the Keynesian IS-LM analysis via 
stock-flow equilibrium of the capital market with capital mobility between countries. (For 
a good discussion of the Mundell-Fleming model, one may refer to Frenkel and Razin 
(1987).) The Mundell-Fleming model becomes a dynamic one through the addition of 
disequilibrium adjustment equations with rational expectations by Dornbush (1976) (the 
so-called “overshooting model”). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) pioneered the 
research into this kind of open macroeconomic model to explain the balance of payment 
situations arising in various countries. (See Rogoff (1990, 2002) and Obsfeld (2001) for 
an excellent review of this research.) With the availability of open macroeconomic 
models, there was a natural curiosity among the economists as to whether the 
macroeconomic policy framework of a single country could be extended to the question 
of macroeconomic policy games between countries. If game theory as a tool and 
multilateral agencies as institutions had been in existence in the late 1920s, the Great 
Depression could have been avoided and competitive devaluations and competitive tariffs 
could have been prevented. This is because game theory tells us that cooperative game 
solutions can improve the solution obtained through noncooperative behavior.  
Game Theoretic RBC Models for Macroeconomic Policy Coordination 
Rational expectations and game theoretic approach were brought into the 
literature on monetary and fiscal policies by Kydland in 1975. In this paper, Kydland 
demonstrates the inferiority of the noncooperative Nash equilibrium as compared to a 
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cooperative solution. He interprets the policy maker as the dominant player and the 
typical individual citizen as the nondominant player. In a subsequent 1977 paper, 
Kydland shows that in such a game with a dominant player, the open loop control policy 
is time inconsistent, and he attributes this to a lack of credibility. He also establishes that 
to get time consistency, one must go for a feedback-control policy. Kydland and Prescott 
(1977) use the concept of rational expectations and argue for the advantage of rule-based 
policies to create a rational expectations equilibrium solution.  
One can apply the above differential game framework with the monetary 
authority and the fiscal authority being the two players of the game. It can then be argued 
that if the monetary authority is truly independent and if one obtains the noncooperative 
solution with each policy maker having his own objective function, the corresponding 
Nash equilibrium is Pareto inferior to a cooperative solution. Petit (1989) established this 
result using differential games with Italian illustration.  
The creation of the European Union (EU, or Economic and Monetary Union, 
EMU), with 11 asymmetric European countries coming under one central European Bank 
and one common monetary policy, raised interesting questions regarding coordinating the 
fiscal policies of the 11 countries with the common monetary policy. Aarle, Engwerda, 
and Plasmans (2002) examine the impact of fiscal policies of member countries with their 
own labor market distortions on the stability and growth of the EMU. They identify the 
need for coordination, such as the stability and growth pact (SGP) that the EMU has. 
They use a differential game model employing Mundell-Fleming-Dornbush type of 
model. Aarle et al. (2002) examine the coalition formation in EMU using such a model. 
Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2005) present second-generation macroeconomic policy 
coordination games that use microeconomic foundations of macroeconomics with market 
imperfections (monopolistic competition).  
Sometimes, macroeconomic policies and multilateral institutions arise in a 
vacuum of a suitable theory. For example, the emergence of the EMU and the formation 
of G-6, G-8, and G-20 nations arose as a need was felt for macroeconomic policy 
coordination between countries. Kumar (1998, 2011) revives the interest in the problem 
of macroeconomic policy coordination by the application of differential game theory. 
A STATISTICAL AGENDA FOR MACROECONOMIC MODELING 
Although the macro models may appear to fit satisfactorily, they lack adequate 
statistical criteria to verify their credibility and suitability for basing macroeconomic 
policies on them. In fact, econometricians did not pay adequate attention to the concept 
and development of the best model and instead seemed to focus on demonstrating the 
usefulness of econometrics by showing that these methods validate the reigning micro- 
and macroeconomic theories. Econometricians thus tended to limit to confirmatory 
modeling and avoid exploratory modeling. They created their models based on an 
existing theory that could have been propped up through a herd behavior. There does not 
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seem to be any adequate effort within the macroeconomic modeling enterprise to 
minimize the errors in models and to adapt them to fit the real data.  
Figure 1 illustrates the relation between the real-world economic situation and the 
theory. Basic assumptions are those that are economic in nature, including whether the 
variables are chosen and represented by a Keynesian model or a monetarist model. 
Extraneous or implied assumptions come from the tools being used, such as whether the 
relations between variables are representable by continuous parametric linear functions, 
continuous parametric nonlinear functions, piece-wise linear functions, nonparametric 
functions, and so on. Therefore, direct logic is that which is applied to the basic economic 
axioms or assumptions, whereas indirect logic refers to logical steps that depend on the 
extraneous mathematical assumptions. Economists pay little attention to this distinction 
and to minimizing the inaccuracies in theoretical models arising from inadequate 
mathematical assumptions.  
Figure 1. Theory and the Real World 
Real 
World
Basic
Assumptions
Extraneous(Implied)
Assumptions
Direct
Logic
Logical 
Errors
Indirect Logic
Theoretical Conclusions
Theory
Deviations Between Real World and Theoretical 
Outcomes
 
The above review of the evolution of mainstream and peripheral theories of 
macroeconomics and policy clearly identifies a few epistemological issues. First of all, as 
explained above, the mainstream model can only be an approximation, and a possibly 
crude one at that. Perhaps the mainstream macroeconomic model should be treated as 
only a general consensus model, and not necessarily a good and statistically credible one. 
The distinction between theory and practice is that theory is general and in practice one 
must adapt a theory to suit a given problem.  
With increasing openness of economies due to globalization, and the increasing 
trade deficit of the United States, it is necessary to consider open macroeconomic models. 
As macroeconomic policies of different countries are dependent on each other, conflicts 
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and coordination between them should then be an endogenous part of the development of 
such macroeconomic models (Kumar 2011). 
Recently, knowledge-based decisions employing business analytics have become 
more prevalent and credible in the business world. Business analytics squeezes as much 
information as possible from the data by using the most suitable model. In selecting the 
best fitting model, business analytics uses fundamental statistical principles of reducing 
the errors and error variance and employs the latest statistical techniques on data mining. 
Businesses do not buy economics or economic models or economic advice unless they 
are credible and show some dependable results. Similar standards must apply for 
macroeconomic theory and policy that use macroeconomic models.  
While the macroeconomic debate has focused on which variables should be 
included in an economic model, rarely has it examined carefully the patterns in economic 
data that define both what variables should be utilized and in what functional form. 
Exploratory data analysis and data mining are some of the emerging areas in business 
analytics that can be put to use in macroeconomic modeling to discover these patterns in 
data. While discovering these patterns, one might even find that linear relations have to 
be replaced by nonlinear ones, and parametric relations replaced by nonparametric ones, 
or even functional relations replaced by algorithmic rules. 
An econometric model is supposed to specify the joint distribution of all 
endogenous variables, given the predetermined variables. This is normally done by 
specifying the mean and variance of each endogenous variable in terms of other 
endogenous variables and the predetermined variables. The main objective of selecting 
the variables and the functional specification is to maximize the information on the 
unknown parameters of the joint distribution of all the endogenous variables. Here, the 
statistical concepts of information, information limit to variance, redundant information, 
sufficient information, sufficient statistics, and ancillary statistics are quite useful (see 
Tong, Kumar, and Huange (2011:430–33)). Econometric theory does not seem to have 
made the best use of these fundamental concepts of statistical inference and how best to 
employ them to extract the best possible information or signals from the economic data.  
The model errors depend on aggregation errors, measurement errors (also known 
as errors in variables), or specification errors in specifying the equations of the model. In 
any statistical modeling exercise, the scientific criterion should be to minimize the extent 
of the error in the model. As macroeconomics deals with aggregate variables, one must 
pay attention to aggregation errors. One can measure the aggregation error by building 
models at smaller community levels and aggregating them to build aggregate models. 
The error sums of squares in the aggregated model must be much smaller than the sum of 
sums of squares of the component sub-models. Although both economy-wide and 
regional models have been built, no attempt seems to have been made to check the 
consistency of these models by comparing the model-predicted aggregates with actual 
observed aggregates. Nor have attempts been made to measure the possible extent of 
aggregation errors and to reduce them. Macroeconomic models for small areas like 
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs) and Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Kumar  Building Credible Brackish-Water Open Macroeconomic Models  13 
Areas (BEAs) could provide the necessary insights to specify the macroeconomic models 
for a state or a nation.  
Another major model error is measurement errors, or errors in variables. It is 
possible that the variables as actually measured differ from the economist’s perception, 
and these differences may be compounded by further inconsistencies between regions. 
Economists often accept the data as given and do not question their accuracy.  
Finally, we have equation errors, which may be associated with each equation of 
the model. The model error is the sum of the equation errors. For policy makers, different 
equations (referring to different endogenous variables) may have differing relevance to 
policy. In reducing the sum of squared equation errors, one must weigh the equation 
errors by the importance attached to those variables.  
Just as game theorists use the term “sub-game perfection” in econometric model 
building, one may use the term “sub-model perfection,” in which each sub-model is 
selected based on whether it is the best fit with the observed data. By sub-model, we 
mean each equation, each group of equations, and constituent sub-models, built over 
space and commodity or industry spectra. This concept becomes highly relevant in 
macroeconomic model building if one uses exploratory data analysis to determine 
patterns. 
Kocherlakota’s concerns about model inadequacy were prompted by the 
perception that, although the models may have qualitatively predicted the recession, they 
did not adequately indicate quantitative answers on the severity and acceleration of the 
recession and what corrective steps should be taken. Hence, the policy maker should be 
concerned with credible quantitative answers and not with incredible (sic) qualitative 
answers (Kocherlakota 2010). If the policy objective is to determine credible quantitative 
answers, model credibility in terms of minimizing the three types of errors deserves the 
highest priority in econometric research. 
We have determined that more than one theory or model can explain the observed 
data, and when this happens, the selection of the appropriate model seems to be made 
more by the herd behavior of economists than by any scientific criteria of model fit and 
reduction of errors in modeling. The greater the degree of unexplained error variance in 
the model, the greater is the possibility that at least one other model can better explain the 
data. Hence, one must reduce the error variance in models to sharpen the theory. 
Macroeconomists seem to have an infatuation with mathematical and statistical theories 
and with models with much less emphasis on empirical verification and underlying 
process detail. A similar kind of situation resulted in the microeconomic theory of the 
firm based on Adam Smith’s invisible hand principle, and competitive markets became 
irrelevant for business policy and business decisions in oligopolistic markets with 
managerial interventions (visible hand) through advertisement expenditure and 
managerial decisions. This gave rise to a managerial revolution (Chandler 1977). We now 
witness similar irrelevance of macroeconomic models due to a lack of credibility of 
macroeconomic theory and models, resulting in a call for a macroeconomic revolution to 
address the issue of differing degrees of empirical credibility. 
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How can such credibility be secured? Macroeconomic modeling has emphasized 
sticking to a model specification that is in conformity with the mainstream theory with an 
acceptable statistical fit. One should instead shift to a new paradigm of best fitting model 
specification. The specification can be improved by a proper choice of variables included, 
by selection of the functional form assumed for the equations of the model, and by using 
nonparametric functional forms. Some of these pattern-recognition and data-mining 
techniques have not been exploited fully by macroeconomists. Han and Kamber (2006) 
provide information on data mining, and Tong, Kumar and Huang (2011) outline a 
business analytic approach to econometrics.  
The suitability of the macroeconomic model dictates the efficacy of a 
macroeconomic policy it produces. If the model is incongruous, the resulting policy will 
be ineffective; the degree of ineffectiveness depending on the degree of misspecification. 
Intuitively, some kind of a proximity theorem would apply, and the effectiveness of the 
policy would increase by reducing the error of the model. Quantitative model building is 
like a production activity. The objective of that production is a good model fit with least 
possible model error. (For information criteria in fitting models to achieve statistical 
credibility, see Chapter 10 in Tong, Kumar and Huang (2011), and also Bozdogan 
(2000). The quantity and quality of output achieved in macroeconomic modeling depends 
on the inputs used. With teamwork and coordination and through economies of scale and 
scope, one can achieve better modeling outcomes.  
To achieve such economies of scale and scope, the necessary institutional 
mechanisms must be developed. Economic models must be built at local, state, national, 
national union, and global levels. Models built at a higher level of aggregation must be 
checked against their constituent parts at lower levels of aggregation. The necessary 
institutional support for building and verifying these models must be provided through 
the state budgets and through contributions by the constituent chambers of commerce and 
industry that are likely to benefit from such models. At the inter-country or global level, 
such efforts must be supported by the multilateral agencies such as the EU, the World 
Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). For the situation we are facing of 
prolonged global recession today, we need credible macroeconomic models of policy 
coordination that could be  supported by the IMF and the World Bank.      
A CASE FOR BRACKISH-WATER ECONOMICS 
If a policy maker depends upon sweetwater economics or saltwater economics to 
generate the model and ensuing policies, and the true model is closer to a brackish-water 
one, this will lead to a policy intervention that generates its own disequilibrium dynamics 
over and above the naturally existing disequilibrium. Such disequilibrium dynamics 
generate their own expectations, which cause further deviations and accentuate the extent 
of the business cycle. The best way to dampen such cycles is not to use policy biases but 
to use brackish-water economic policies instead. Both political parties in the United 
States must develop a common platform and a consensus on what types of economic 
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policies are useful for the country to maintain its comparative advantage in the long run, 
and they must agree to provide bipartisan support for such policies.    
REFERENCES 
Aarle, Bas Van, Jacob Engwerda, and Joseph Plasmans. 2002. “Monetary and Fiscal 
Policy Interaction in the EMU: A Dynamic Game Approach.” Annals of 
Operations Research 109:229–64. 
Adrian, Tobias and Hyun Song Shin. 2010a. “The Changing Nature of Financial 
Intermediation and the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009.” Annual Review of 
Economics 2:603–18. 
Adrian, Tobias and Hyun Song Shin. 2010b. “Financial Intermediaries and Monetary 
Economics.” Pp. 601–50 in Handbook of Monetary Economics. Vol. 3, edited by 
B. M. Friedman and M. Woodford. Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
Alsena, Alberto. 1988. “Macroeconomics and Politics.” Pp. 17–52 in NBER 
Macroeconomics Annual, edited by Stanley Fisher. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Aoki, M. 2002. Modeling Aggregate Behavior and Fluctuations in Economics: Stochastic 
Views of Interacting Agents. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Aoki, M. and H. Yoshikawa. 2006. Reconstructing Macroeconomics: A Perspective from 
Statistical Physics and Combinatorial Stochastic Processes. New York: 
Cambridge University Press.  
Auerbach, Alan and Laurance Kotlikoff. 1987. Dynamic Fiscal Policy. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Banerjee, Abhijit. 1992. “A Simple Model of Herd Behavior.” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 107(3):797–817. 
Bozdogan, H. 2000. “Akaike Information Criterion and Recent Developments in 
Informational Complexity.” Journal of Mathematical Psychology 44(1):62–91. 
Bruno, Michael and Jeffrey Sachs. 1985. Economics of Worldwide Stagflation. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Canzenori, Mathew B, Robert E. Cumby, and Behzad T. Diba. 2005. “The need for 
International Policy Coordination.” Journal of International Economics 66:363–84.  
Chandler, Alfred D. 1977. The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American 
Business. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.   
Cooper, J. Phillip and Stanley Fisher. 1974. “Monetary and Fiscal Policy in a Fully 
Stochastic St Louis Model.” Journal of Money Credit and Banking 6(1):1–22. 
Dornbush, R. 1976. “Expectations and Exchange Rate Dynamics.” Journal of Political 
Economy 84:1161–76. 
Drazen, Allan. 2001. “The Political Business Cycle Research after 25 Years.” Pp. 75–138 
in Macroeconomic Annual 2000, edited by B. Bernanke and K. Rogoff. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
Frenkel, Jacob A. and Assaf Razin. 1987. “The Mundell-Fleming Model Quarter Century 
Later: A Unified Approach.” IMF Staff Papers 34:567–620. 
Georgescu-Roegen, Nicholas. 1971. The Entropy Law and the Economic Process. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
16  Journal of the Indiana Academy of the Social Sciences Vol. 16, No. 2: Fall-Winter 2013 
Greenwald, B. and Joseph E. Stiglitz. 1987. “Keynesian, New Keynesian and New 
Classical Economics.” Oxford Economic Papers 39(1):119–32. 
Han, Jiawei and Micheline Kamber. 2006. Data Mining: Concepts and Techniques. 2nd 
ed. Burlington, MA: Morgan Kaufmann Publishers. 
Harcourt, G. C. 2006. The Structure of Post Keynesian Economics. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Hibbs, D. 1977. “Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policies.” American Political 
Science Review 71:1467–87.  
Hibbs, D. 1994. “The Partisan Model of Macroeconomic Cycles: More Theory and 
Evidence for the United States.” Economics and Politics 6:1–24. 
Keynes, John Maynard. 1936. General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. San 
Diego, CA: Harcourt, Brace and Company. 
Keynes, John Maynard. 1939. “Professor Tinbergen’s Method.” Economic Journal 
49(195):558–77. 
Klein, L. R. 1947. The Keynesian Revolution. New York: McMillan. 
Kocherlakota, Narayana. 2010. Modern Macroeconomic Models as Tools for Economic 
Policy. Minneapolis, MN: Federal Reserve Bank. 
Kumar, Krishna T. 1998. “Models of North-South Trade, Growth, and Development as 
Differential Game Problems.” Economic and Political Weekly 34(5): 233–38. 
Kumar, Krishna T. 2002. “Time to Make Time Endogenous: An Edgeworthean Approach 
to Macroeconomic Modeling.” Presented at the 38th annual meeting of the Indian 
Econometric Society (TIES), December, Madras Institute of Development 
Studies, Chennai.  
Kumar, Krishna T. 2003. “A Policy Framework for Trade Policies of a Developing 
Country in a Global Economy.” Pp. 190–218 in Economy and the Quality of Life: 
Essays in Memory of Ashok Rudra, edited by A. K. Bagchi, M. Chattopadhyay, 
and R. Khasnabis. Kolkata, India: Dasgupta and Company Private Limited.  
Kumar, Krishna T. 2011. “Strategic Interaction and Macroeconomic Policy Coordination: 
An Outline of a New Differential Game Approach.” Pp. 573–95 in Dynamics, 
Games, and Science I, edited by M. Peixoto, A. Pinto, and D. Rand. Springer 
Proceedings in Mathematics. 
Kydland, Finn. 1975. “No Cooperative and Dominant Player Solutions in Discrete 
Dynamic Games,” International Economic Review 16(2):321–35. 
Kydland, Finn and Edward S. Prescott. 1977. “Rules Rather than Discretion: The 
Inconsistency of Optimal Plans.” Journal of Political Economy 85:473–90.  
Kydland, Finn and Edward S. Prescott. 1982. “Time to Build and Aggregate 
Fluctuations.” Econometrica 50:1345–70. 
Nordhouse, William D. 1975. “The Political Business Cycle.” Review of Economic 
Studies 42(2):169–90. 
Obstfeld, Maurice. 2001. “International Macroeconomics beyond the Mundell-Fleming 
Model.” Berkeley, CA: UC Berkeley Center for International and Development 
Economics Research. Retrieved (http://escholarship.org/uc/item/6796n8s0). 
Kumar  Building Credible Brackish-Water Open Macroeconomic Models  17 
Patinkin, Don. 1975. “Keynes and Econometrics: On the Interaction between the 
Macroeconomic Revolutions of the Interwar Period.” Econometrica 44(6):1091–
1123. 
Petit, M. L. 1989. “Fiscal and Monetary Policy Coordination: A Differential Game 
Approach.” Journal of Applied Econometrics 4:161–79. 
Prescott, Edward S. 1986. “Theory Ahead of Business Cycle Measurement.” Federal 
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review 24(1):9–22. 
Rogoff, Kenneth. 1990. “Equilibrium Political Business Cycles.” American Economic 
Review 80(1):21–36.  
Rogoff, Kenneth. 2002. “Dornbush’s Overshooting Model after 25 Years.” IMF Staff 
Papers 49(1):1–35. 
Tong, Hengqin, T. K. Kumar, and Yangxin Huang. 2011. Developing Econometrics. 
West Sussex, UK: John Wiley and Sons.  
Triffin, Robert. 1960. Gold and the Dollar Crisis: The Future of Convertibility. New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Weber, Mark. 2011. How Hitler Tackled Unemployment and Revived Germany’s 
Economy. Institute for Historical Review. Retrieved 
(http://www.ihr.org/other/economyhitler2011.html). 
Woodford, Michael. 1999. “Revolution and Evolution in Twenty First Century 
Macroeconomics.” Prepared for “Frontiers of the Mind in the Twenty First 
Century” conference. 
Woodford, Michael. 2010. “Financial Intermediation and Macroeconomic Policy.” 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 24(4):21–44. 
